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In 1995, the Supreme Court reversed the imposition of a one hundred dollar fine
for violating disclosure requirements in Ohio election law.1  The case involved the late
Mrs. Margaret McIntyre, who had distributed homemade leaflets arguing against a
proposed local school tax levy, some of which were signed only by “CONCERNED
PARENTS AND TAX PAYERS.”2  The rationale for the Court’s decision was a robust
understanding of privacy rights for political speech and association: “The decision in
favor of anonymity may be motivated by fear of economic or official retaliation, by
concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of one’s
privacy as possible.”3
For a time, it appeared that McIntyre might herald a more capacious understanding
of the interests in anonymity when ordinary individuals engage in politically-related
speech.  Two later Supreme Court cases relied on the broad conceptualization of pri-
vacy in McIntyre to invalidate state or local laws mandating disclosure: one required
that people wear identification badges when gathering petition signatures in connec-
tion with ballot initiatives,4 and another mandated prior registration for door-to-door
canvassers.5  Assessing these trends, I published a law review article in 2003 that
suggested the Supreme Court might find constitutional problems with mandatory
disclosure of modest campaign contributions.6
* Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. William & Mary Bill of
Rights Journal Symposium: Privacy, Democracy, and Elections, October 22, 2010. I am
grateful to Rebecca Hulse and the students and staff at William & Mary for organizing this
excellent symposium. I also thank Richard Briffault, Guy Charles, James Gardner, Rick Hasen,
Chris Hoofnagle, and Priscilla Regan for especially helpful comments. I received excellent re-
search assistance from University of Minnesota law and political science student Thomas Pryor.
1 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 338 & n.3 (1995). The Ohio
statute applied to any “general publication” that sought, among other things, to “influence the
voters in any election.” Id.
2 See id. at 337 (quoting one of Mrs. McIntyre’s leaflets).
3 Id. at 341–42.
4 Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 199 (1999) (citing
McIntyre decision as “instructive”).
5 Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 166 (2002)
(quoting language from McIntyre with approval).
6 William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre’s Checkbook: Privacy Costs of Political Contribution
Disclosure, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 33–48 (2003).
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Boy, was I wrong. High Court rulings since then have consistently upheld dis-
closure requirements in election law.7  Last year the Court, by an 8-1 vote in Doe v.
Reed, brushed aside personal privacy interests of people whose signatures referendum
petitions would be posted online, and the majority opinion never even cited McIntyre.8 
These newer cases returned to an earlier understanding of privacy that requires proof
of a “reasonable probability” of “threats, harassment, or reprisals” to raise constitu-
tional problems.9  While the judicial branch relaxed its scrutiny, the other branches
increased disclosure in elections by imposing more requirements, releasing more data,
and enabling internet technology to spread the disclosed information more widely.10
Outside of government, some scholars and advocates have questioned whether this
embrace of disclosure gives short shrift to privacy concerns.  This symposium exem-
plifies the ongoing debate about privacy and elections within academia.  Yet serious
attention to political privacy remains relatively invisible compared to areas such as
health care or social media.11  Judicial and scholarly analyses typically ignore the
extensive development by privacy scholars of theoretical justifications for personal
privacy and anonymity in many realms.
The time is ripe to reconsider the Court’s cramped view of privacy in politics. 
Thanks to the internet, the intrusiveness of disclosure has grown greater than ever
before.12  Besides, the current loophole-ridden regime doesn’t even work: the recent
7 See Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010); Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010);
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
8 Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2815–21.
9 See, e.g., id. at 2820 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (per curiam));
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916 (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 198).
10 In campaign finance, one comprehensive report found in all these respects “a clear and
continuing trend toward greater public access to campaign disclosure data at the state level.”
See CAMPAIGN DISCLOSURE PROJECT, GRADING STATE DISCLOSURE 2008, at 2, available at
http://www.campaigndisclosure.org/gradingstate/GSD08.pdf [hereinafter GRADING STATE
DISCLOSURE]; see also Reporting Contributions Bundled by Lobbyists, Registrants and the
PACs of Lobbyists and Registrants, 72 Fed. Reg. 62,600 (proposed Nov. 6, 2007) (to be codi-
fied at 11 C.F.R. § 104.22) (imposing new federal campaign finance disclosure regulations);
Miriam Galston, Campaign Speech and Contextual Analysis, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 100,
131–32 (2007) (discussing new federal disclosure rules for tax-exempt organizations); Lloyd
H. Mayer, The Much Maligned 527 and Institutional Choice, 87 B.U. L. REV. 625, 626–27
(2007) (same). Meanwhile, California apparently is the only state that now exempts petitions
from presumptive public disclosure. See Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2826–27 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (citing CAL. GOVT. CODE ANN. § 6253.5 (West 2008); CAL. ELEC. CODE ANN.
§ 18650 (West 2003)); id. at 2828 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (stating that only one state has
such limited disclosure).
11 See, e.g., James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137 (2009); Deven
McGraw, Privacy and Health Information Technology, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 123 (Fall
Supp. 2009).
12 See infra notes 27–34 and accompanying text.
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midterm elections featured rampant circumvention of disclosure requirements by
savvy big donors.13
This Symposium Essay updates what I wrote eight years ago about the costs of
disclosure and applies the theoretical insights of privacy scholars to the full range
of disclosure requirements in election law—especially in campaign finance, but also
including petition signatures and even party registration.14  It argues that the interest
in anonymous political participation should not be anchored only in effects-oriented
reasoning that demands a danger of imminent physical or financial harm.  Election law
and policy should recognize a broader range of circumstances where disclosure may
discourage political involvement, and also should respect personal interests in dignity
and autonomy that animate much of privacy law and theory in other areas.  Beyond just
chilling effects, privacy law and commentary increasingly recognize that Mrs. McIntyre
has an interest in the integrity of her persona.  Whether in constitutional jurisprudence
or in workaday policy decisions, disclosure rules must better embody the tricky balance
between ideals of open elections, encouraging engagement in politics, and the classic
“right to be let alone.”15
Part I of the Essay describes the current pro-disclosure atmosphere and notes some
reasons it might change.  Part II critiques the cramped view of privacy interests now
dominating election law jurisprudence.  Part III brings better-developed privacy theory
into the picture.  It shows how a more robust understanding of privacy respects indi-
viduals’ interests in their private personae and autonomous development of beliefs, not
just their physical or economic security.  Finally, although this Essay focuses on pri-
vacy costs, Part IV briefly discusses what a broader understanding of these costs might
mean for both constitutional jurisprudence and wise policy around disclosure in election
law.  This examination does not compel any sweeping ban on disclosure laws, but it
does indicate that we are too cavalier about privacy interests today.
I. THE CURRENT SITUATION AND THE PROSPECT OF CHANGE
A. Current Law and Rhetoric
Because others have written comprehensive recent summaries of current law,16 I
will offer only a brief recap here.  The Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in McConnell
13 See infra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.
14 See McGeveran, supra note 6.
15 See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
195 (1890) (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, COOLEY ON TORTS 29 (Chicago, Callahan & Co.
2d ed. 1888)).
16 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J. 273,
279–86 (2010), Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclosures About Disclosure, 44 IND. L. REV. 255,
257–70 (2010).
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v. FEC17 initiated the turn away from the broader McIntyre view to an older and nar-
rower understanding of relevant privacy interests.  The McConnell Court, while striking
down some provisions of the McCain-Feingold campaign finance law,18 upheld that
statute’s enhanced requirements for disclosure of political contributions.19  Without
citation of McIntyre, the decision reached back to earlier cases and determined that
only “economic reprisals or physical threats as a result of the compelled disclosures”
would seriously chill political activity, so that only rules with these dramatic results
would raise constitutional difficulties.20
Last year’s decisions in Citizens United v. FEC21 and Doe v. Reed22 intensified this
focus on a narrow set of harms.  Both cases repeated the requirement that an as-applied
challenge must demonstrate a “reasonable probability” that disclosure would result in
“threats, harassment, or reprisals”—language originating in the landmark Buckley v.
Valeo case from 1976.23  While the Court left open an extremely narrow opportunity
for exceptions in particular circumstances,24 these cases represent an almost complete
disregard for individual privacy interests, especially compared to the McIntyre decision. 
A few lower courts have struck down some disclosure requirements based on their
administrative burdens on small-scale political activity.25  But reliance on McIntyre
and political privacy rationales against disclosure has dried up almost entirely in recent
lower court decisions.
B. The Prospect of Change
At first blush, the recent expansion of disclosure requirements and the string of
Supreme Court decisions upholding them might appear to foreclose any significant
change in our approach toward privacy in politics.  Notwithstanding this trend toward
ever-increasing disclosure, however, certain recent developments might—and should—
force courts and policymakers to reevaluate.26
17 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
18 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81.
19 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 108.
20 Id. at 198 (comparing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), with NAACP
v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)).
21 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
22 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010).
23 424 U.S. at 74.
24 See infra Part II.C.
25 See Sampson v. Buescher, 625 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2010); Canyon Ferry Rd. Baptist
Church of E. Helena, Inc. v. Unsworth, 556 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 2009). But see Worley v.
Roberts, No. 4:10CV423-RH/WCS, 2010 WL 4339374 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 26, 2010) (denying
preliminary injunction in similar circumstances).
26 See Briffault, supra note 16, at 276 (suggesting that both constitutional and policy
approaches to campaign finance disclosure may be appropriate for reconsideration).
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First, the changing nature of journalism and the maturation of the internet con-
tinue to intensify the effect of disclosure on ordinary political participants.  Internet
disclosure on a massive scale changes everything.27  In the past, disclosed data entered
general circulation only if conventional media outlets considered it especially news-
worthy.28  Traditional news judgment involved choosing individual political actions of
special relevance to highlight, and surrounding this information with extensive context. 
This occurs rarely: even in jurisdictions with strong campaign finance disclosure re-
gimes, for example, newspapers publish very few stories about political fund-raising.29
As conventional news outlets shrink overall and cut back political coverage in par-
ticular, we see two online replacements arising, each with some of their own problems. 
First, online databases offer massive quantities of searchable information, in the hope
that voters might use it to sort for useful heuristic cues about their votes.30  The over-
whelming volume of data becomes so unmanageable, however, that it offers little aid
to the average voter.31  Dissemination of raw data removes most of the filtering func-
tion once performed by journalists, so drops of relevant information mix with oceans
of data.32  Alternatively, new “informational entrepreneurs”33 such as interest groups
and partisan bloggers provide their own analysis of disclosed data.  However, these
groups naturally shape the narrative about disclosed data to suit their own purposes
and agendas.34
27 See Mayer, supra note 16, at 276–77; McGeveran, supra note 6, at 10–13.
28 See Nancy S. Marder, From “Practical Obscurity” to Web Disclosure: A New Under-
standing of Public Information, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 441, 449 (2009).
29 See Raymond J. La Raja, Sunshine Laws and the Press: The Effect of Campaign
Disclosure on News Reporting in the American States, 6 ELECTION L.J. 236, 246–47 (2007)
(summarizing results of empirical study).
30 The Federal Elections Commission’s disclosure database is a representative example.
See Campaign Finance Disclosure Data Search, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, http://www.fec
.gov/finance/disclosure/disclosure_data_search.shtml (last visited Apr. 10, 2011). Many states
disclose this much information or more online. See GRADING STATE DISCLOSURE, supra
note 10.
31 See Briffault, supra note 16, at 288; Mayer, supra note 16, at 265–67; Justin M.
Sadowsky, The Transparency Myth: A Conceptual Approach to Corruption and the Impact
of Mandatory Disclosure Laws, 4 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 308, 332–34 (2005).
32 See Briffault, supra note 16, at 288.
33 See Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors and Campaign
Disclosure Laws in Direct Democracy, 4 ELECTION L.J. 295, 298 (2005).
34 See Robert F. Bauer, Not Just a Private Matter: The Purpose of Disclosure in an
Expanded Regulatory System, 6 ELECTION L.J. 38, 52–53 (2007) (pointing out that independent
good-government organizations responsible for much disclosure of “money in politics” also
pursue their own agenda of promoting increased electoral regulation); PROP 8 MAPS,
http://www.eight maps.com/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) (opponents of a referendum
disclosing donors who supported it); KNOW THY NEIGHBOR, http://knowthyneighbor.org/
(last visited Apr. 10, 2011) (gay rights organization identifying people who signed the
petitions to put measures on the ballot that the organization opposes).
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Whether or not it is funneled through a third-party intermediary, both routes for
disclosure expose the personal political beliefs of individuals, without necessarily
yielding a corresponding increase in useful information for voters.35  As online dis-
closure replaces traditional news media, tens of thousands of average people whose
names would never appear in any story in the Washington Post nevertheless find their
political activity reported in online databases hosted by the Huffington Post.36  This
exposure has accelerated with every election cycle, and it may create momentum for
reconsidering the values behind disclosure.
A second possible catalyst for change is more political.  Advocates for campaign
finance regulation who support pervasive disclosure must be careful what they wish for. 
Traditional opponents of campaign regulation frequently cite disclosure as the cure for
abuses—and as a worthy substitute for other rules such as contribution limits.37  Courts
often adopt this reasoning, striking down other rules while emphasizing that the benign
alternative of disclosure supposedly keeps campaign abuses in check.38  This “deregu-
late and disclose” strategy only works if it can portray disclosure as virtually cost-free.39 
Supporters of broader regulation may have played into their adversaries’ hands, accept-
ing the proposition that privacy costs of disclosure are unimportant.  If they realize
their error, advocates of campaign finance reform could shift toward a more nuanced
view of political privacy interests and their relationship to other regulatory tools.
Finally, and perhaps most important, disclosure failed colossally in the 2010 elec-
tion.  The upside-down rules reached their absurd climax, exposing numerous instances
of small-scale citizen participation but concealing the giant influence of financially and
politically powerful entities.40  In campaign finance, federal law required disclosure of
numerous two-hundred fifty dollar contributions to candidates but allowed Crossroads
GPS to raise forty-three million dollars in unlimited donations from undisclosed sources
35 See McGeveran, supra note 6, at 26–29.
36 See Campaign Donors: Fundrace 2010, HUFFINGTON POST, http://fundrace.huffington
post.com (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) (allowing visitors to search for political campaign con-
tributors by name, address, location or occupation).
37 See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 663, 688 (1997) (“What scenario are we left with if both political expenditure and con-
tribution limits are deemed unconstitutional? Will political money proliferate indefinitely, along
with its accompanying harms? Not necessarily, provided that the identity of contributors is
required to be vigorously and frequently disclosed.”).
38 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010) (“With the advent of the
Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the
information needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their positions
and supporters.”).
39 See Briffault, supra note 16, at 286–87 (discussing the embrace of the “deregulate and
disclose” approach by critics of campaign finance regulation).
40 See David G. Savage, Ad Transparency Not So Clear; Loopholes, Laxity Let Big Sums
Flow for Campaigns, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 27, 2010, at A14.
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under section 501(c)(4) of the tax code.41  Similarly, Supreme Court case law confers
greater anonymity on organized entities collecting signatures than on the individual
voters signing them, thanks to the contrast between Doe v. Reed (which found disclo-
sure of petition signatories unobjectionable) and an earlier precedent rejecting require-
ments that petition circulators wear identification badges.42
As reformers sift through the failures and abuses of the 2010 election and formulate
their response, they should recognize the need to revisit disclosure.  Part II discusses
some of the problems they may now see with current thinking.
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE NEW OLD DISCLOSURE STANDARDS
As described in Part I, most courts in the last decade relied on an earlier charac-
terization of privacy interests from Buckley v. Valeo43 rather than the more recent and
broader understanding in McIntyre and its progeny.44  This Part identifies how these
new standards—the same as the old ones—underrate important values and interests in
political privacy.  First, the orthodox view of privacy harms in election law construes
those harms much too narrowly.  Second, it adheres to an inflexible view that divides
all information into “public” and “private” categories without reference to particular
circumstances.  Finally, the means by which current doctrine allows for exceptions to
the general rule of disclosure offers no help to most political actors with compelling
privacy interests.
Before proceeding, one clarification is in order.  There are sound reasons for courts
to limit constitutional requirements and defer to the political branches and to the states
in the particular design of electoral structures.45  As will be clear below, I am not argu-
ing for a sweeping constitutional right of anonymity in political activity.  In principle,
legislators and election administrators could provide greater protection for privacy than
any constitutional minimum.46  In practice, they don’t.  Because courts have engaged
in more explicit and extensive analyses of the tension between privacy and disclosure
41 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4) (2006); see also Peter Overby & Andrea Seabrook, ‘Independent’
Groups Behind Ads Not So Independent, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 27, 2010), available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130836771; Kenneth P. Vogel, SEIU,
American Crossroads Look Back at 2010 Spending, POLITICO (Dec. 14, 2010, 9:52 PM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1210/46355.html.
42 Compare Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010), with Buckley v. Am. Constitutional
Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
43 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (per curiam).
44 See infra Part I.
45 See Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2818 (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433–34 (1992));
id. at 2830 & n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring in part); Richard H. Pildes, Foreword, The Constitu-
tionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28 (2004). But see Meyer v. Grant, 486
U.S. 414, 424–25 (1988) (rejecting expansive “greater includes the lesser” interpretation of
state power to regulate petition-gathering procedures).
46 See Briffault, supra note 16, at 276, 295.
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than other institutions, this Part focuses on the judicial articulation of privacy interests. 
To the extent that legislators and election administrators pay any attention to those
interests, they generally share the courts’ narrow understanding of relevant privacy
costs.47  These policymakers could broaden their view, and part of my goal in critiqu-
ing the courts is to encourage them to do so.
A. Narrow Views of Harm
The crucial shortcoming in the dominant valuation of privacy is twofold.  First, the
standard limits privacy costs to dramatic physical or economic attacks by one’s oppo-
nents.  The formulaic words most often repeated in the major Supreme Court decisions
speak of “threats, harassment, or reprisals.”48  This language calls to mind violent hatred
directed toward civil rights activists in the segregated South or McCarthy Era black-
lists.49  Indeed, several key cases in which the Supreme Court upheld political privacy
arose in precisely these unusual circumstances.50  Sometimes, the phrasing suggests
a limitation of privacy interests to a chilling effect on the precise political activity at
issue, not even on political activity in general.51  In his Doe concurrence, Justice Stevens
goes further still, insisting upon “a significant threat of harassment directed at those
who sign the petition that cannot be mitigated by law enforcement measures.”52
Second, not only does this view construe the chilling effect too narrowly, but it
ignores entirely any other deleterious effects beyond the chilling ones.  Debates about
privacy of medical records, financial transactions, or online activity all consider the
possibility that disclosure might inhibit desirable behavior.53  Those debates then
47 See id. at 293–94 (explaining that over the last century, federal and state campaign dis-
closure laws have reflected the Court’s “lump it” attitude towards donors’ privacy concerns).
48 See Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2821; Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010);
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 198 (2003); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 71.
49 On the pervasive dangers of blacklists beyond initial reprisals, see generally Seth
Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure
in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1991).
50 See Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87 (1982);
NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
51 See Daniel Winik, Note, Citizens Informed: Broader Disclosure and Disclaimer for
Corporate Electoral Advocacy in the Wake of Citizens United, 120 YALE L.J. 622, 646–48
(2010) (describing the Court’s requirement that governmental interests in disclosure outweigh
privacy interests unless reprisal is likely in that instance).
52 Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2831 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
53 See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1193, 1215–17 (1998) (“[P]ersonal information can be misused by making us vulnerable
to prejudice or unwarranted disesteem.”); McGraw, supra note 11, at 124 (“Without appro-
priate protections for privacy and security in the healthcare system, some patients engage in
‘privacy-protective’ behaviors to avoid having their personal health information used inappro-
priately. According to a recent poll, one in six adults (17%)—representing about 38 million
persons—say they withhold information from their health providers due to worries about how
the medical data might be disclosed.”).
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extend much further to consider additional inherent values of information privacy.  For
example, we consider medical or sexual privacy important for its own sake, regardless
of whether disclosure would inhibit an individual’s future use of the health care system
or activities in the bedroom.
Courts and policymakers ignore reality if they require blacklists or burning crosses
before recognizing any potential chilling effect.  And they arbitrarily disregard impor-
tant interests if they consider disincentives to future behavior the only valid concern
about disclosure.  As described below in Part III, privacy scholars have developed
sophisticated normative and theoretical explanations of the value of privacy that move
well beyond this narrow view.
B. “Public” and “Private”
Traditionally, U.S. law has viewed privacy dichotomously: a set of defined in-
formation merits protection, but “for all the rest, anything goes.”54  Thus, in the elec-
tion disclosure cases, calls for “civic courage,” characterizations of political activity
as “lawmaking,” and references to the “public sphere” all endeavor to define conflict
away, simply by placing involvement with elections on the “public” side of a clear and
dispositive line.55
These gambits beg the main question.  After all, we go to great lengths to preserve
the anonymity of voting, the most fundamental electoral activity.  If political contribu-
tions or petition signatures are “public” and voting “private,” it is only because legal
rules say so, and perhaps because those rules eventually shape public expectations.56
Most privacy scholars reject the simplistic notion that people reveal the same
information about themselves in every context57—and also rejects any notion that
they should do so.58  Rather, ordinary people play different roles in different portions
of their lives—work, family, various distinct circles of friends and acquaintances,
church, online activity, and so forth.59  Social scientists have long understood that
54 Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 136–37
(2004); see also DANIEL SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 143–49 (2004).
55 See, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2828–29 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., concurring);
id. at 2836–37 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
56 See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1142–43 (2002).
57 For some foundational arguments to this effect, see generally, ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY
AND FREEDOM 53–54 (1970); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968). I go into more
depth about the importance of context in Part III.C, infra.
58 For this reason I question James Gardner’s suggestion in this symposium that “sincerity,”
or the notion that citizens must act in accordance with a true self, represents a requirement of
good citizenship. James A. Gardner, Anonymity and Democratic Citizenship, 19 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 927, 940–42 (2011). As Gardner himself acknowledges in quoting psychology
scholar John Suler, “a single disinhibited [self] probably does not exist at all. . . .” Id. at 949 (quot-
ing John Suler, The Online Disinhibition Effect, 7 CYBERPSYCHOL. & BEHAV. 321, 325 (2004)).
59 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV.
919, 958–70 (2005) (applying network theory to privacy law).
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the information others hold about us greatly influences the way we navigate these dif-
ferent roles.  Erving Goffman’s classic sociological examination, The Presentation of
Self in Everyday Life, analyzes how that knowledge changes behavior.60
In areas where contemporary privacy concerns loom especially large (including
interactions in social media, online targeted advertising, and disclosure of government
records), the traditional dichotomies do a poor job of addressing widespread concerns. 
In each of these situations, information was revealed in one setting but later disclosed
in a different and more invasive setting.  So too with actions such as giving a dona-
tion or signing a petition; these may appear to be a private political commitment at
the moment they are consummated but, depending on the law, they may result in the
permanent identification of individuals’ political beliefs through Google.
C. Unavailability of Exceptions
Political privacy interests should not trump disclosure rules based only on “rank
conjecture and speculation.”61  Yet onerous requirements for proving a “reasonable
probability” of “threats, harassment, and reprisals” make it difficult to mount an as-
applied challenge to any disclosure requirement.  For starters, the Supreme Court
never articulated the standard very clearly.62  Buckley v. Valeo specified that courts
should permit “flexibility in the proof of injury.”63  On the other hand, that case also
assumed that “[w]here it exists the type of chill and harassment identified in NAACP
v. Alabama can be shown.”64  Demonstrating possible injury from disclosure has not
always been so easy.  The Socialist Workers Party secured an as-applied exemption to
campaign finance disclosure from the Supreme Court, but the Party was able to pre-
sent plentiful specific evidence of severe government and private retribution aimed
directly at the organization and its members.65
60 See, e.g., ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959).
For just one example of relevant discussion found throughout this classic work, see id. at
222–25.
61 Doe v. Mortham, 708 So. 2d 929, 935 (Fla. 1998); see also, e.g., Ohio Right to Life
Soc’y, Inc. v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, No. 2:08-cv-00492, 2008 WL 4186312, at *9 (S.D.
Ohio Sept. 5, 2008) (“Plaintiff . . . has not even attempted to establish a record that would
permit this Court to conclude that its contributors face a real threat of retaliation if their
names were disclosed.”).
62 See ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1206 (E.D. Cal. 2009)
(“Supreme Court precedent regarding the appropriate standard of review is not a model of
clarity.”).
63 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (per curiam).
64 Id.
65 Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 98–101 (1982);
see also Averill v. City of Seattle, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1178 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (granting
exemption for political campaign associated with Freedom Socialist Party based on evidence
of death threats).
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In practice, courts rarely grant exceptions to disclosure. Most of those are issued
to marginal political groups, often socialists, with little realistic likelihood of influ-
encing any election.66  Courts often emphasize the small scale of political activities,
limiting the impact of political privacy cases to situations like Mrs. McIntyre’s modest
personal pamphleteering.67  When supporters of a 2008 California ballot proposition
to ban gay marriage sought an exemption and presented anecdotal evidence of death
threats, boycotts, and vandalism,68 the court explicitly relied on the success of the
measure as a basis for rejection.69  That court went on to limit the exemption to fringe
political activity, holding that “minor status is a necessary element of a successful as-
applied claim,” but not a sufficient basis, and that exemptions were limited to “groups
seeking to further ideas historically and pervasively rejected and vilified by both this
country’s government and its citizens.”70  In other words, exemptions from disclosure
would only be available when the disclosed activity has no effect on political outcomes.
In his Doe concurrence, Justice Alito argued that, to be effective, exemptions from
disclosure must not be delayed past the time of the political activity in question and
must not demand an unrealistic evidentiary showing of the necessary effects.71  These
two features interact in a potentially pernicious way: if an as-applied exemption re-
quires proof of actual reprisals against the signers of a petition, for example, then by
definition it cannot be secured in advance.72  No other Justice signed his concurrence,
and only Justice Thomas dissented from the 8-1 ruling in the case.73
66 See, e.g., Brown, 459 U.S. at 92–93 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 60–74 (characterizing
as-applied exemption as limited to “minor parties”)); Averill, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 1178 (involv-
ing socialist candidate in municipal election); McArthur v. Smith, 716 F. Supp. 592 (S.D. Fla.
1989) (same).
67 See, e.g., Swaffer v. Cane, 610 F. Supp. 2d 962, 970–71 (E.D. Wis. 2009); Doe v.
Mortham, 708 So. 2d 929, 934–35 (Fla. 1998).
68 ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1200–04 (E.D. Cal. 2009); see
also Briffault, supra note 16, at 275 (discussing the California situation and opining that “the
incidents that did occur raise troubling questions about the potential for disclosure to undermine
political participation”).
69 ProtectMarriage.com, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 1214 (“They were successful in their endeavor
to pass the ballot initiative and raised millions of dollars in the process. This set of circum-
stances is a far cry from the sixty-member SWP party [in Brown], repeatedly unsuccessful at
the polls, and incapable of raising sufficient funds.”).
70 Id. at 1215.
71 Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2822–23 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he as-applied
exemption becomes practically worthless if speakers cannot obtain the exemption quickly and
well in advance of speaking. . . . Additionally, speakers must be able to obtain an as-applied
exemption without clearing a high evidentiary hurdle.”).
72 Id. at 2823–24 (arguing that evidence of harassment against signers of a petition in one
state should be probative of possible harassment against signers of a similar petition in another
state).
73 See id. at 2837 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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In contrast to Justice Alito’s concerns, several other Justices in Doe expressed
palpable skepticism about as-applied exemptions (or, in the case of Justice Scalia,
hostility to the entire notion of political privacy).74  In all, four current Justices
(Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor) signed one of the opinions stat-
ing such views.75  Justice Stevens also was in that group, so it was actually a five-vote
majority in Doe that nearly foreclosed exemptions.  With his retirement, it is just
possible to imagine a coalition of five Justices (Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, and
Kagan) who might give as-applied challenges a realistic chance of success beyond
extreme cases.  But the general trajectory of the Court’s jurisprudence does not create
much cause for optimism.
As discussed further below, a richer account of the values underlying political
privacy would support more robust protection, and also would provide more useful
guidance for the development of political disclosure practices that afford the proper
respect to privacy.  To be sure, at the extremes, the dangers of disclosing personal in-
formation can run to such consequences as stalking, harassment, loss of a job, or retri-
bution from powerful entities.  But there is more to data privacy than the prevention
of these especially serious and relatively unusual harms.
74 See id. at 2829 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (arguing that courts should be “deeply
skeptical” of as-applied challenges to disclosure of petition signers in referendum campaigns);
id. at 2831 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (considering a
successful as-applied challenge “unlikely” and opining that judges should require “a significant
threat of harassment . . . that cannot be mitigated by law enforcement measures” and should
“demand strong evidence” of such dangers); see also id. at 2836–37 (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment) (arguing against any constitutional scrutiny of disclosure requirements).
75 It is possible that the Justices’ views were colored by the nature of the particular issue
in Doe, a referendum to repeal gay rights legislation. See id. at 2816 (majority opinion). It may
be coincidence, but Justices generally seen as more likely to support gay rights wrote the
opinions most skeptical about the prospect of as-applied exemptions in Doe, and vice versa.
Meanwhile, Justice Scalia’s hostility to the concept of political privacy dates at least to his
scathing dissent in McIntyre. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 371 (1995)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). On the other hand, in an unusual case ordering an injunction against
televising a trial on the constitutionality of a similar ballot initiative in California, five Justices
(Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito) credited anecdotal evidence of threats and
reprisals against supporters of the referendum. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct. 705, 707,
712–13 (2010). Four other Justices (Stevens, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor) dissented,
partly out of disagreement with the majority’s finding of irreparable harm to those supporters.
Id. at 718–19 (Breyer, J., dissenting). While I personally support gay rights and oppose the ref-
erenda at issue in Doe and Hollingsworth, that should have no bearing on the privacy analysis.
Privacy interests, like free speech rights, must belong especially to those with whom we dis-
agree strongly. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression
of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”). As a check
against this bias, readers who disagree with the Doe plaintiffs’ views should imagine instead
that those persons had signed a gay rights petition in a conservative state.
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III. BRINGING INFORMATION PRIVACY THEORY TO ELECTION LAW
Privacy theory has undergone great development in the last fifteen years—more
or less the same time span in which election law moved from the expansiveness of
McIntyre to the narrow focus of Doe v. Reed.76  Much of the new privacy theory re-
sponds to problems far removed from the administration of elections, such as the after-
math of the 2001 terrorist attacks,77 the spread of increasingly pervasive technology
like video cameras and ubiquitous computing,78 or changes in regulation of the health
care and financial industries.79  But this thinking also offers useful guidance for recon-
sidering many elements of election disclosure law and the scope of political privacy.
A. Public, Private, and Context
Privacy theory has developed a more sophisticated view of the delineation be-
tween the public and the private than any found in election law rhetoric.80  In response
to the traditional view’s unsatisfactory normative grounding, scholars have urged a
shift to a less rigid view of the information that might qualify for privacy protection.81 
An approach more sensitive to the nature of the initial disclosure of information and of
the subsequent redistribution of that information would not rest simply on categorical
definitions of inherently “sensitive” or “private” data.82
Helen Nissenbaum calls her version of this approach “contextual integrity.”83 
Rather than governing privacy by placing every piece of information in one of two
76 For helpful overviews of the development of data privacy law, see generally Neil M.
Richards, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 GEO. L.J. 1087 (2006) (reviewing SOLOVE,
supra note 54); Paul M. Schwartz & William M. Treanor, The New Privacy, 101 MICH. L. REV.
2163, 2176–84 (2003) (reviewing JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE,
RESISTANCE AND THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY (2001)).
77 See Richards, supra note 76, at 1088.
78 See HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 192–93 (2010); Mark Jonathan Blitz,
Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a
World that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1349 (2004); A. Michael Froomkin, The
Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1476–79, 1497 (2000); Jerry Kang & Dana Cuff,
Pervasive Computing: Embedding the Public Sphere, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV 93 (2005).
79 Froomkin, supra note 78, at 1474; Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act, Information Privacy, and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV.
1219 (2002); Peter A. Winn, Confidentiality in Cyberspace: The HIPAA Privacy Rules and
the Common Law, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 617 (2002).
80 See supra Part II.B.
81 See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV.
1609, 1664–70 (1999); Strahilevitz, supra note 59, at 973–80.
82 See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections
Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 1013 (2003); Strahilevitz, supra note 59, at 921.
83 Nissenbaum, supra note 54, at 137.
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boxes, she argues, we should observe the distinct norms associated with different
activities and environments.84  These norms identify what sorts of disclosures might
be appropriate, and to whom.  While she does not discuss election disclosure in par-
ticular, Nissenbaum more generally presents the movement of public records online
as a case study.85  In that context, she concludes that the radical increase in access to
personal information and the extensive data mining by third parties pull this disclo-
sure away from its original context and its purpose of government accountability, thus
breaching contextual integrity.86  This conclusion does not forbid disclosure, but does
signal the need to carefully justify it based on countervailing values.87
Another eminent privacy scholar, Daniel Solove, has developed an influential
descriptive taxonomy of privacy that responds to a range of loosely related harms.88 
These harms include chilling effects, but extend to a wide range of other problems,
some of which share only “family resemblances” to one another.89  Like Nissenbaum,
Solove advocates a move away from rigid classifications of “public” and “private.”90
These richer accounts of privacy interests entail a two-step analysis.91  The relation-
ship of political activity to the larger realm of public affairs would be relevant, but not
conclusive.  First, one would need to assess existing norms about disclosure—is a
particular political activity closer to the entrenched norm of the secret ballot or to the
equally well-established (if self-evident) norm that lawn signs and bumper stickers rep-
resent intentional public declarations of support?  I would argue that donations, peti-
tion signatures, and party registration generally are not intended as announcements of
political views to one’s neighbors.  Any communication to the general public in these
settings is ancillary, and comes about solely because of legal rules that require it.  An
individual may not realize the public disclosure that will occur later as a result of those
rules.  Because this flow of information to other people in other contexts is largely
unanticipated and unintended, these acts are not inherently public.
At the second step, even when approaches such as contextual integrity suggest
that privacy interests are at stake, those interests might give way to countervailing
values in particular situations, as described further below.92  The baseline presumption,
however, would favor privacy rather than disclosure, and this would represent a signif-
icant departure from current thinking.  Instead of requiring justification for privacy,
this approach would demand good reason for disclosure.
84 Id. at 136–38; see also NISSENBAUM, supra note 78.
85 Nissenbaum, supra note 54, at 120–21.
86 Id. at 151–52.
87 Id. at 146.
88 See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006).
89 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 42–44, 174–79 (2008).
90 Solove, supra note 82, at 1013.
91 See, e.g., NISSENBAUM, supra note 78, at 186–230.
92 See infra Part IV.
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B. Digital Dossiers
Beyond the broader chilling effect, a critical aspect of the modern threat to privacy
arises from the aggregation of vast quantities of information about individuals.  These
“digital dossiers” permit data mining with sophisticated algorithms to search for pat-
terns of behavior and taste.93  Marketers, creditors, government officials, employers,
and many others—including political campaigns—can reach additional inferences
about individuals’ preferences and proclivities with these tools.  Each drop of infor-
mation added to the mix seems trivial, but the cumulative effect is profound.94  Digital
dossiers contain plentiful data from disclosed public records, including such items as
voter turnout, political contributions, and petition signing.95
Even if these dossiers contain only “public” information, its processing and use
raise independent privacy concerns.  The law has recognized these issues for many
years, going back to the enactment of the Fair Credit Reporting Act96 in 1970.  That
statute is more concerned with the crunching of data by credit bureaus and reliance on
the results by lenders and employers than on the original collection of the information.97
Privacy scholars identify a range of consequential concerns about data aggregation. 
To start with, dossiers may be wrong, either because they contain erroneous information
or because of flaws in the algorithmic assumptions applied to data.98  Those inaccura-
cies can lead to direct harm such as denial of credit or reputational injury, and indirectly
they prompt misjudgments of others based on fragmentary and possibly incorrect in-
formation.99  The mystery surrounding the mechanized process by which unknown
entities draw conclusions about our character causes independent harm, because the
lack of transparency prevents individuals from responding to decisions, or even under-
standing them.100  As Daniel Solove has suggested, the appropriate literary metaphor
for this privacy invasion from data mining is not Orwell’s 1984 but Kafka’s The
Trial, with its inscrutable bureaucratic assessments of individual character.101  Finally,
even seemingly anonymized data may, in combination with other identifiable data
and some relatively basic computer science techniques, be re-identified—and every
93 See ROBERT O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE 34–73 (2005); SOLOVE, supra note
54, at 13–26.
94 See Froomkin, supra note 78, at 1502–06 (discussing the phenomenon of “privacy
myopia”); SOLOVE, supra note 54, at 44–45.
95 See SOLOVE, supra note 54, at 20.
96 Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1127, 1128 (1970).
97 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (2006).
98 See O’HARROW, supra note 93, at 139–42.
99 See JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA
8–11 (2000).
100 Tal Z. Zarsky, Thinking Outside the Box: Considering Transparency, Anonymity, and
Pseudonymity as Overall Solutions to the Problem of Information Privacy in the Internet
Society, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 991, 1005–24 (2004).
101 SOLOVE, supra note 54, at 37–55.
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additional piece of data released to the public makes the task of re-identification
incrementally easier.102
Scholars also point out how the mere act of slicing and dicing aspects of our
identity in this way can offend our individual dignity and autonomy.  Some suggest
that commodifying personal beliefs (and especially political ones) as a means to sell
toothpaste threatens to so intrude on aspects of our self that it ought to lie beyond the
reach of alienability and markets.103  As Julie Cohen argues in her powerful response
to the dominant rhetoric praising “knowledge” and “sunlight”:104
The more profound objection to the prevailing legal-economic
approach to information is that it conflates information with knowl-
edge of (or truth about) reality.  Information theory, in contrast,
recognizes that ‘information’ and ‘reality’ are different (though
related) things, and that ‘knowledge’ forms an imperfect and cul-
turally contingent bridge between them. . . .  Data processing prac-
tices are predicated on a belief that individuals are reducible to
the sum of their transactions, genetic markers, and other measur-
able attributes . . . .105
To be sure, the government’s disclosure of data about individual political activity
represents only a small portion of the cause of these problems.  Yet as noted above,
every added bit of data contributes to the problems.
Moreover, political personal information raises special concerns.  First, it is a
relatively sensitive data point compared to an individual’s favorite laundry detergent
or even one’s online activity.  Second, its diversion to unintended purposes, political
or non-political, may particularly debase collection of information originally intended
for high-minded functions such as preserving the integrity of elections.106
When this political information is in turn used for political purposes, it can also
have negative effects on democratic discourse.  Campaigns and other political actors
increasingly process data about voting and other political activity to tailor messages
102 See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1719–23 (2010).
103 See Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055,
2069–72 (2004) (analyzing the commodification of personal information through processing
and trade).
104 See Julie Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object,
52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1375 (2000); see also Kreimer, supra note 49, at 6–7.
105 Cohen, supra note 104, at 1404–05.
106 See Marder, supra note 28, at 450 (discussing use of disclosure information by
Proposition 8 activists to confront those who disagree with their views); McGeveran, supra
note 6, at 18 (discussing appropriation of disclosed political information for commercial pur-
poses); see also supra notes 83–89 and accompanying text (discussing contextual integrity).
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and guide get out the vote efforts.107  Trenchant critiques question whether the increas-
ingly narrow targeting of political discourse enabled by this data mining threatens
values of broader societal dialogue.  As privacy expert Peter Swire has phrased it,
“[A] pessimistic vision is [that] we’re splitting America into tiny pieces and we’re
not sharing America.”108
Processing personal information obviously provides many benefits, both com-
mercial109 and political,110 that can offset these problems.  After all, campaigns use the
stuff because they find it effective.  And most of the advantages feel more tangible
than the drawbacks.  Nevertheless, releasing information about individual political be-
liefs exacerbates the problematic aspects of aggregation and data mining.  Concerns
about our digital dossiers extend well beyond the sorts of “threats, harassment, and
reprisals”111 credited in current law, and deserve consideration in the balancing of pros
and cons from political disclosure laws.
107 See Guy Charles & Sunshine Hillygus, Panel Remarks at the William & Mary Bill of
Rights Journal Symposium: Privacy, Democracy & Elections (Oct. 22, 2010) (on file with
author). As one journalist describing the Obama campaign’s massive data mining effort sum-
marizes its implications:
It means the campaign may not wind up wasting time contacting people
who are probably voting for McCain, and that when Obama aides or
volunteers go out looking for supporters, they have a pretty good idea of
what issues those potential supporters care about most. It’s the political
equivalent of what big corporate marketers have been doing for years:
If you’re a baby boomer living in Westchester County, N.Y., golf gear
catalogs will show up in your mailbox, but if you’re a 20-something
living in Williamsburg, Brooklyn, you might get a free trial of Spin
magazine instead. Now the same goes for politics—if you’re in a demo-
graphic that makes you statistically likely to have children, Obama might
send you an e-mail about education policy instead of one about taxes.
Mike Madden, Barack Obama’s Super Marketing Machine, SALON (July 16, 2008, 7:00 AM),
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2008/07/16/obama_data (describing the implications of
the Obama campaign’s massive data mining efforts); see also Michael S. Kang, From Broad-
casting to Narrowcasting: The Emerging Challenge for Campaign Finance Law, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1070, 1070 (2005); Jon Gertner, The Very, Very Personal is the Political, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2004, (Magazine), at 42.
108 Swire raised these concerns in an interview in connection with the PBS series Frontline.
Interview with Peter Swire, Ohio State Law Professor, Frontline: The Persuaders (June 1,
2004), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/persuaders/interviews
/swire.html. Swire continued, “[A]nother pessimistic problem here is that it’s manipulation.
It’s a hidden persuader, because we don’t realize that we’re being pigeonholed; we don’t
realize that the words we’re reading are not the words that people down the street are reading,
and we might be fooled that way.” Id.; see also supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text
(discussing lack of transparency in data mining as a distinct source of harm).
109 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 153, 155 (1999).
110 James Verini, Big Brother Inc., VANITY FAIR (Dec. 13, 2007), http://www.vanityfair
.com/politics/features/2007/12/aristotle200712.
111 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (per curiam).
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C. The Bigger Chill
The first two sections of Part III have argued that excessive disclosure of informa-
tion about individual political activity wrenches information out of its original context
and facilitates aggregation and processing of personal data, both of which can dis-
advantage and dehumanize its subjects.  This section focuses on the responses of in-
dividuals to these problems.  In some ways, that response could be called a chilling
effect, but one much broader and more insidious than the narrow band of extreme
situations now recognized as concerns related to political disclosure.
Unlike dramatic confrontations from the Civil Rights Era or extreme outliers
such as socialist parties, most expressions of political views do not draw such colorful
opposition.  I have previously catalogued many situations where individuals might
legitimately expect and desire privacy around their political affairs—from journal-
ists and pastors maintaining their impartial image to neighbors and friends withhold-
ing political views from those whom they suspect disagree.112  I will not repeat those
exhaustively here.
In numerous settings, people generally consider their political views to be deeply
personal matters—hence the common warning of etiquette mavens to be delicate when
discussing them.113  Despite plentiful talk about the issue in both case law and schol-
arship, however, there remains precious little empirical work on the existence and
strength of such inhibitions and their effect on behavior, and what research exists
does not permit robust conclusions.114
Modern privacy theory can help fill this empirical gap.  For example, Paul
Schwartz has drawn on the concept of preference falsification in social norm theory to
demonstrate how everyday social pressures and the human desire to conform constantly
shape disclosure of individual views and tastes, and eventually might change those
views.115  A more comprehensive and accurate view of chilling effects would acknowl-
edge how this insidious process of preference falsification interferes with political
112 McGeveran, supra note 6, at 16–24 (noting negative consequences of displaying one’s
political beliefs in, among others, professional, commercial, and social contexts).
113 See, e.g., PEGGY POST, EMILY POST’S ETIQUETTE 288 (17th ed. 2004).
114 See Gardner, supra note 58; Mayer, supra note 16, at 278–79 (calling research on the
question “almost nonexistent”). For some modest efforts to gather empirical measurements
about political chilling effects, see DICK M. CARPENTER II, INST. FOR JUSTICE, DISCLOSURE
COSTS: UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 7–8 (2007), available
at http://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/other_pubs/DisclosureCosts.pdf (reporting results of a
telephone survey); Christian R. Grose & Carrie A. Russell, Avoiding the Vote: A Theory and
Field Experiment of the Social Costs of Public Political Participation 17–25 (Vanderbilt
University Dep’t of Political Sci., Working Paper, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com
/abstract=1310868 (reporting experiment comparing turnout at the Iowa Caucus among groups
who were and were not sent postcards explaining the public nature of voting in the caucus).
115 See Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 840–43
(2000).
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participation.  The prospect of disclosure can discourage individuals from taking cer-
tain political actions, and it pushes citizens toward conformity with dominant views.116
First, the chill on present and future participation is a serious problem.  One should
anticipate that individuals who wish to avoid confrontation with others, or to maintain
an apolitical reputation within at least some of their relationships, likely avoid political
activity that will later be disclosed.117  Moreover, the perception of possible negative
consequences itself can contribute to a chill on political activity.118  In other areas of
much less dramatic societal importance than political debate, privacy rules recognize
the risk that disclosure might inhibit honest communication and self-expression.119
It is platitudinous in political discussion to praise high voter turnout, perhaps
explaining why the secret ballot remains sacrosanct in that discourse.  There is more
ambivalence about the virtues of other means of engagement with elections, and par-
ticularly financial contributions.120  We should want to encourage all different forms
of involvement, however, from voting to contributing money to signing petitions to
volunteering for campaigns, because broader participation enriches the debate for all
of us and opens avenues of political self-realization for individuals.  Moreover, various
forms of political activity reinforce one another.  For instance, one empirical study
examined actual petitions and voter files to determine that signing petitions correlates
positively with the same individual later turning out to vote, even among otherwise
less habitual voters.121
Second, disclosure and resulting social pressures (or perceived risks of those pres-
sures) do not affect all views equally.  Disclosure and preference falsification have the
greatest impact on controversial views that challenge the consensus.122  This is pre-
cisely why socialist parties often benefit from exemptions under current law, because
disclosure imposes a disparate impact on those views.123  Why stop there, however? 
Democrats in a largely Republican town, Republicans in a workplace dominated by
Democrats, tea party adherents in blue states, and gay rights supporters in red states all
116 See Kreimer, supra note 49, at 97 (discussing the “conformity-inducing” effects of
disclosure).
117 Id. at 67–71 (discussing social pressure received in response to disclosure).
118 See Mayer, supra note 16, at 278–80.
119 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
120 Richard Briffault, The Return of Spending Limits: Campaign Finance After Landell v.
Sorrell, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 399, 432 (describing other means of engagement with elections).
121 See Janine Parry et al., We Know What You Did Last Summer: The Impact of Petition
Signing on Voter Turnout, presentation to the Annual Meeting of the State Politics and Policy
Section of the Am. Political Sci. Ass’n (June 4, 2010), available at http://www.sppc2010.org/
Papers/SPPC%202010%20parry%20smith%20henry%20final.pdf.
122 See McGeveran, supra note 6, at 22 (“This lopsided impact, favoring plain-vanilla
candidates and causes over others, distorts the marketplace of ideas and further threatens First
Amendment values.”); Schwartz, supra note 115, at 841 (“[B]eyond a certain point of intensity,
this herd behavior distorts public discourse . . . .”).
123 Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 100–02 (1982).
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might face significant negative consequences if their identities and views are disclosed
publicly.  These consequences look more like the “social ostracism”124 and “desire to
preserve as much of one’s privacy as possible”125 of McIntyre than the overt harass-
ment or reprisals of more recent cases, but they are no less real.
Many individuals whose opinions differ from those around them will put their
heads down and disengage from political activity if that is the only way to avoid disclo-
sure.  When they do, society loses the benefit of their diverse ideas, prevents them from
locating and engaging with like-minded followers of their minority viewpoint, and re-
inforces social and political conformity.  In an ironic twist, the more subtle chill that
goes unrecognized in the dominant account can actually lead to just the sort of demo-
cratic distortions and disparate impact that the doctrine sought to avoid by exempting
socialists and Freedom Riders from disclosure obligations.
Like the gravitational pull of an unseen planet, we can use what we know from
privacy theory about individuals’ tendency to communicate and alter their views as a
means to ascertain the existence of a more serious chilling effect than that recognized
in current doctrine.  Privacy protects individuals from the scrutiny of others and the
accompanying social pressure that can discourage and distort their actions.126  Election
law ought to prioritize those protections.
D. Democratic Development
The final concern extends beyond the traditional “marketplace of ideas” scope of
election-law thinking to embrace a view of the First Amendment concerned with in-
dividuals’ self-actualization and autonomous formation of their own political views.127 
On this account, individuals engage in political activity in part to fulfill their own
search for truth and meaning, and disclosure impedes their freedom to do so.
It is peculiar that election law, which often claims special devotion to constructing
and maintaining sheltered space for democratic processes, tends to have so little regard
for data privacy. Data privacy is a precondition for democratic society.128  Democratic
participation necessarily requires that individuals enjoy some private breathing space
for exploration, reflection, and expression of political views.129  Neil Richards calls
124 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995).
125 Id.
126 See Schwartz, supra note 115, at 841.
127 See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 22–24 (1989).
128 See Schwartz, supra note 81, at 1648–53.
129 See Julie E. Cohen, The Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright
Management” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 1007 (1996) (noting threat to privacy
value from copyright protection technology that monitors reading activity); Neil M. Richards,
Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 416–25 (2008); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and
Participation: Personal Information and Public Sector Regulation in the United States, 80
IOWA L. REV. 553, 559–63 (1995).
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this value “intellectual privacy.”130  Legal and social institutions protect intellectual
privacy in many ways, such as the Fourth Amendment safeguard of personal papers,
statutes and regulations prohibiting electronic eavesdropping on personal conversa-
tions, and libraries’ maintenance of confidentiality about borrowers’ book choices.131 
Election law ought to follow suit.
A supporter of disclosure in election law might respond to these observations by
conceding the importance of private reflection for political self-realization, but argue
that disclosed activities such as financial contributions or petition signatures constitute
public “legislating.”132  Perhaps, but deciding the question requires more than a simple
assertion.  Declaring that donations or signatures automatically qualify as public acts
repeats the question-begging error discussed above.133  We should evaluate each form
of political activity on a case-by-case basis rather than relying on historically-rooted
categorical definitions of public and private.  The courts have recognized, for example,
that interactions with petition circulators provide an opportunity for individuals to edu-
cate one another about issues and for those on the receiving end of a solicitation to
further develop their own views.134  Whatever advantages may flow from disclosure
in these situations are purchased with the foreclosure of intellectual privacy and with
lost opportunities to help individual citizens formulate their own views.  The dominant
thinking in election law disregards this trade-off.
IV. RECALIBRATING THE BALANCE
I want to close with some brief comments about how to integrate these insights
from privacy theory into election law’s treatment of disclosure.  Up to this point, I have
argued that privacy interests threatened by disclosure requirements are broader and
more nuanced than election law currently recognizes.  Yet none of the courts or scholars
discussed here would consider those interests absolute.  On the contrary, everyone rec-
ognizes the need for a balance between privacy and the legitimate interests advanced
by transparency.135  The problem addressed by this Essay is the inaccurate weight
given to privacy interests, which throws off that crucial balance.
130 Richards, supra note 129, at 389 (“Intellectual privacy is the ability, whether protected
by law or social circumstances, to develop ideas and beliefs away from the unwanted gaze or
interference of others.”).
131 See id. at 412–25.
132 See, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2833–34 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
133 See supra Part II.B.
134 See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421–23 (1988).
135 See, e.g., McGeveran, supra note 6, at 49–50 & n.242 (discussing balance of benefits
and burdens from campaign finance disclosure); Nissenbaum, supra note 54, at 146, 151
(identifying countervailing values that could justify intrusions on contextual integrity, including
mention of “open government”); Schwartz, supra note 115, at 840 (“To be sure, democratic
community requires access to personal data.”); see also supra note 15 and accompanying text
(introducing the factors that must be balanced when considering disclosure rules).
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Because it relies on privacy theory, this Essay has focused on the “cost” side of
the scale.  I will not engage in detailed analysis of the “benefit” side, except to note
that courts often assume extensive benefits that do not necessarily stand up to exami-
nation.136  Admittedly, voters may gain useful heuristic cues from information about
the position of familiar organized entities with respect to candidates and, especially,
ballot initiatives.137  But there are many questions about how often voters actually rely
on such data, whether a surfeit of information might overload them, and whether the
possible usefulness of information about the political preferences of the oil industry
or labor unions realistically extends to information about ordinary individuals’ per-
sonal views.138
However significant the benefits of disclosure, privacy theory suggests that they
do not categorically trump an accurate understanding of privacy costs.  Rather than
the overwhelming presumption in favor of disclosure now applied, courts and policy-
makers should consider the importance of contextual integrity, the problem of data
mining, a more realistic assessment of chilling effects, and the core role of privacy in
democratic development.  If they do so, there will be considerably less reliance on
disclosure than we see today.
This recalibrated balancing would highlight the central importance of scale in
evaluating both costs and benefits of disclosure.  On the benefit side, public knowl-
edge of single financial contributors or individual signatories on a petition offers little
helpful information to most voters, and provides minimal aid in controlling corruption
or enforcing other election laws.139  On the other hand, knowing about very large
donations that effectively bankroll a candidate or ballot initiative, or about organized
entities supporting a petition drive, would more likely provide valuable information
to voters and perhaps bear on corruption concerns.140
136 I examined those justifications at length in my earlier article. See McGeveran, supra
note 6, at 24–33 (analyzing government interests in preventing corruption and perception of
corruption, informing voters, and aiding in enforcement of campaign finance law); see also
Briffault, supra note 16, at 286–90 (examining benefits of disclosure in context of evaluating
“deregulate and disclose” or “disclosure-only” models of campaign finance regulation); Mayer,
supra note 16, at 257–71 (analyzing government interest in informing voters); Scott M.
Noveck, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Legislative Process, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
75, 77–89 (2010) (reviewing egalitarian and anti-corruption rationales for disclosure).
137 See, e.g., Garrett & Smith, supra note 33, at 296–99 (arguing that mandatory disclosure
is an important component of voters’ ability to use organized groups’ support of ballot initia-
tives as a heuristic cue); Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and
Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63, 72
(1994) (using a survey of ballot initiative voters to assert that relatively uninformed voters used
their knowledge of the insurance industry’s preferences to emulate the behavior of relatively
well-informed voters).
138 See Mayer, supra note 16, at 265–70; McGeveran, supra note 6, at 24–29.
139 These are the three governmental interests identified in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
66–68 (1976) (per curiam).
140 See Garrett & Smith, supra note 33, at 296 (describing how regulatory loopholes that
allow “political entities wishing to avoid disclosure relating to the source and extent of their
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Courts have acknowledged this scale difference in some recent campaign finance
decisions where they diminished the weight of the state’s informational interest in pro-
portion to the amount of money contributed or spent in political activity.141  A number
of observers, including me, have opined that thresholds triggering disclosure obliga-
tions should be raised meaningfully so that only the “big fish” suffer potential privacy
costs.142  Perversely, the current regime often does exactly the opposite, disclosing
modest individual political activity while allowing savvy interest groups and wealthy
individuals to evade disclosure altogether.143
In addition to raised thresholds, policymakers might consider other methods to
advance disclosure’s goals without revealing small-scale political actions that identify
individuals’ beliefs.  For example, reports of aggregate information about small donors
might provide many of the same benefits without exacting any privacy costs.144  And,
as many reformers have already noted, it might make sense to extend disclosure to
areas where it currently falls short, such as the use of nonprofit entities that fall outside
existing requirements or the bundling of donations.145  The scale of these activities
increases the justification for disclosure requirements, more so than in many areas
where those requirements now exist.
Finally, and crucially, privacy theory focuses on individuals, not collectives.  The
theory of contextual integrity, or a more nuanced understanding of personal private
space, relies on the dignity interests of individuals and a respect for their autonomy,
reputation, and capacity to form life plans.146  Case law is the same.  McIntyre focused
on individuals’ interests, concluding that protection for some anonymous political
spending” to do so and thus hide their influence); Mayer, supra note 16, at 283 (“As for
concerns relating to corruption or the perception of corruption . . . it is the higher dollar
amount contributors that raise such concerns, not the $200 or even $1000 contributors in
most instances.”).
141 See Sampson v. Buescher, 625 F.3d 1247, 1261 (10th Cir. 2010) (“There must be a
‘substantial relation’ between the requirement and a governmental interest that is sufficiently
important to justify the burden on the freedom of association.” (citing Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct.
2811, 2818; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64)); Canyon Ferry Rd. Baptist Church of E. Helena, Inc.
v. Unsworth, 556 F.3d 1021, 1034 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he value of public knowledge that the
Church permitted a single like-minded person to use its copy machine on a single occasion to
make a few dozen copies on her own paper—as the Church did in this case—does not justify
the burden imposed by Montana’s disclosure requirements.”).
142 See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 16, at 300–02; Mayer, supra note 16, at 281–83;
McGeveran, supra note 6, at 51–52.
143 See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.
144 See Briffault, supra note 16, at 301; McGeveran, supra note 6, at 53–54; Noveck,
supra note 136, at 107–14.
145 See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 16, at 302 (advocating for public disclosure of bundling).
146 See Cohen, supra note 104, at 1423–27; Nissenbaum, supra note 54, at 154–55; Michael
Selmi, Privacy for the Working Class: Public Work and Private Lives, 66 LA. L. REV. 1035,
1045 (2006). Forced campaign disclosure is an affront to all of these interests. See McGeveran,
supra note 6, at 19–20.
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speech “exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the First Amendment
in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation—and their ideas from
suppression—at the hand of an intolerant society.”147  Classic disclosure cases allow-
ing the NAACP to withhold the names of its members explicitly rely on protection of
the individual members’ rights, and allow the organizations to assert those personal
rights on their behalf.148
A corporation, a political action committee, or a tax-exempt social welfare orga-
nization each has a legal identity that brings with it certain election-related rights—
arguably more rights than ever after Citizens United v. FEC.149  But these entities do not
have individual privacy rights like natural persons do.150  Corporations cannot bring tort
suits based on privacy or infliction of emotional distress.151  Just this year, the Supreme
Court unanimously rebuffed an effort to extend the “personal privacy” exemption
under the Freedom of Information Act to corporations.152  Without a persona, there
is no privacy interest.153  As a result, the concerns discussed in this Essay should not
apply to proposals for enhanced disclosure of such group activity in response to
Citizens United.154
147 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995).
148 See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960) (“On this record it suffi-
ciently appears that compulsory disclosure of the membership lists of the local branches of
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People would work a significant
interference with the freedom of association of their members.”); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 458–59 (1958) (finding that the NAACP has standing to “assert, on
behalf of its members, a right personal to them to be protected from compelled disclosure by
the State of their affiliation with the Association as revealed by the membership lists”) rev’d,
360 U.S. 240 (1959), reh’g denied, 361 U.S. 856 (1959).
149 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
150 Scott Hartman, Comment, Privacy, Personhood, and the Courts: FOIA Exemption 7(c)
in Context, 120 YALE L.J. 379, 391–94 (2010) (drawing on privacy theory to argue that pri-
vacy rights are anchored in the individual’s personhood and are not generally applicable to
corporations).
151 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I cmt. c (1977) (“A corporation, partner-
ship or unincorporated association has no personal right of privacy. It has therefore no cause
of action for any of the four forms of invasion covered by [the privacy torts].”).
152 FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1182 (2011) (“In fact, we often use the word
“personal” to mean precisely the opposite of business-related: We speak of personal expenses
and business expenses, personal life and work life, personal opinion and a company’s view.”).
Although the opinion was narrowly focused on statutory interpretation, it demonstrates the
common-sense difference between “personal” and “corporate” identities. Of course, agencies
do interpret the exemption to protect individual persons’ privacy.
153 See Hartman, supra note 150, at 391–94.
154 See, e.g., Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections
(DISCLOSE) Act, H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. §§ 211, 301 (2010) (requiring organizations
covered under Section 304(g) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to disclose
certain additional information regarding political activity).
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CONCLUSION
This Essay has argued that contemporary privacy theory can contribute a great
deal to thinking about the role and scope of disclosure in election law.  Today’s narrow
view of privacy interests recognizes only imminent harm from “threats, harassment,
or reprisals” as valid reasons to limit political disclosure.  The resulting doctrine ignores
other meaningful harms, it relies on an artificial and unjustified categorical division
between private and public spheres, and it denies realistic opportunities for exceptions
to the general rule of massive disclosure.
Privacy theory offers a richer account of an individual’s interests in controlling his
or her persona, including information about political activity and beliefs.  Political
privacy is a positive value.  A proper understanding of those interests would account
for the importance of personal autonomy, the problems of data-mining and ubiquitous
internet search, and a more sophisticated understanding of chilling effects, preference
falsification, and intellectual privacy.
Bringing privacy theory to election law presents an opportunity.  The existing
overall disclosure regime simply does not work.  It intrusively disseminates vast quan-
tities of information about ordinary individuals’ modest activities but allows huge and
consequential influence to remain concealed.  An accurate balancing of interests, with
a proper regard for the privacy costs of disclosure and not just the alleged benefits,
would yield quite a different set of rules than those we have today.  Proper respect for
Mrs. McIntyre’s persona could provide the cornerstone for a long overdue restructuring
of electoral disclosure.
